









Worker Rights Consortium Assessment re Rights of Association of 
Russell Athletic and Fruit of the Loom Employees in Honduras:  
Analysis of Employee Interviews  
 
Findings and Recommendations 
 










5 Thomas Circle NW     Fifth Floor     Washington, DC  20005      
(202) 387-4884     Fax: (202) 387-3292      
wrc@workersrights.org     www.workersrights.org 
 
Analysis of Employee Interviews 
Re: Russell/Fruit of the Loom  
June 19, 2009 






Interview Process............................................................................................................................. 4 
 
Findings ........................................................................................................................................... 5 
 
Summary of Responses to Standard Interview Questions ............................................................... 6 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations.................................................................................................. 8 
 







Analysis of Employee Interviews 
Re: Russell/Fruit of the Loom  
June 19, 2009 
Executive Summary 
 
This document summarizes the results of worker interviews carried out by the WRC from 
May 23 to June 11 with workers from four of Russell’s Honduran factories. The purpose of 
the interviews was to determine whether, in the aftermath of the closure of the Jerzees de 
Honduras (JDH) facility, workers at these other factories believe that they can exercise 
their associational rights without facing retaliation from management.  
 
As outlined below, the interviews indicate that many of Russell’s Honduran employees 
believe that management will retaliate against any worker who attempts to organize a 
union and that such an effort, in addition to drawing personal reprisals against the workers 
involved, will increase the chances that their factory will close. These results constitute 
compelling evidence that Russell’s current “corrective action plan” has failed to reverse the 
chilling effect of the company’s actions at JDH and that workers at these facilities cannot 





When a company engages in retaliatory firings of workers who seek to exercise their 
associational rights, the impact is felt not just by those who are fired, but by their co-
workers – and, if the case has a high profile, by workers at the sister plants of the affected 
facility. This “chilling effect” is a major concern for labor rights monitors, since it can be a 
very powerful deterrent to the workers’ future exercise of freedom of association. 
Companies seeking to deny workers’ associational rights are generally well are aware of 
this; indeed, the creation of a chilling effect among a company’s remaining employees is 
often the primary purpose of retaliatory dismissals.  
 
The chilling effect at Russell’s Honduran facilities arising from events at JDH is one of the 
central issues in the Russell case. As the WRC has reported, we considered the corrective 
actions announced by Russell in this regard, most notably the reissuance of a prior promise 
to respect workers’ associational rights, to be woefully inadequate to the task at hand – 
given the severity and notoriety of the violations at JDH and given that Russell had 
repeatedly violated its pledge to respect freedom of association after its first issuance. 
Under these circumstances, we did not believe that the mere restatement of that pledge, and 
the other comparably modest steps announced, would convince most of the company’s 
Honduran employees that they could exercise their rights free from fear of reprisal.  
 
Russell has now reported that it has carried out the announced remedial steps, including the 
reissuance of its statement promising to respect workers’ rights of association. It is 
therefore important to evaluate, at this juncture, whether those steps have created a climate 
in Russell’s factories in which workers believe that they can exercise their associational 
rights without reprisal.  
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Toward this end, the WRC, working with our Honduran partner, the Independent 
Monitoring Team of Honduras (EMIH, for its acronym in Spanish), conducted offsite 
interviews with workers at four of Russell’s Honduran factories.   
 
EMIH is a well-respected independent labor rights monitoring organization with particular 
expertise in investigations involving offsite worker interviews. Based in San Pedro Sula, 
Honduras, EMIH has done work for a range of major organizations and brands (including 
Nike, adidas, Gap, and the World Bank).  
 
 
II. Interview Process 
 
A total of 104 workers were interviewed by EMIH from the following factories: Dos 
Caminos, El Porvenir Manufacturing, Jerzees Buena Vista, and DeSoto. The first three of 
these four plants are apparel manufacturing facilities, while the fourth is a manufacturer of 
textiles and socks. The following table sets out the number of workers interviewed at each 
facility, along with a gender breakdown. The free trade zone and city in which each plant is 




























workers 28 25 25 26 104 
% women 71% 76% 84% 58% 72% 
% men 29% 24% 16% 42% 28% 
 
The interview subjects were selected at random. All of the interviews were conducted 
away from the workplace. The interviews were arranged by EMIH without any 
involvement by Russell management or any labor union.  
 
The interviews focused exclusively on the issue of freedom of association. Each worker 
was asked how she/he believes management would respond to an effort by workers to 
unionize; how she/he believes a worker’s personal involvement in union activities would 
effect the way managers treat that worker; whether she/he believes the organization of a 
union would increase the likelihood that their factory would close; whether she/he is aware 
of recent communications from management concerning freedom of association; how 
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III. Findings 
 
It is clear from the interviews that many Russell employees believe that if they try to 
exercise their right to form or join a union, they will be punished by factory management. 
Workers fearing such retaliation expect management to respond with personal reprisals 
against workers involved in a unionization effort and also believe that such an effort would 
increase the chances of the outright closure of their factory. Many workers consider factory 
management to be deeply hostile to the prospect of unionization and believe managers will 
go to great lengths to ensure that no union is formed in their factory. This fear was 
substantially in evidence at all four of the factories at which interviews were conducted. 
Most workers interviewed were well aware of the closure of Jerzees de Honduras. 
 
It is also clear from the interviews that Russell’s corrective action plan is not effectively 
addressing the problem. This plan consists primarily of communications to workers 
pledging that management will respect their associational rights and also includes revisions 
to disciplinary procedures for supervisors and related measures. Some workers interviewed 
were entirely unaware of management’s communications promising to respect the right to 
organize. Those who were aware of these communications were in many cases disinclined 
to believe that they reflect managements’ true intentions. This skepticism that management 
would ever allow a union, and that any worker could engage in union activities without 
facing reprisals, was a clear theme in the testimony of many interviewees. 
 
The interviews also revealed that Russell, even as it communicates its official pledge to 
respect associational rights, is urging workers not to exercise these rights. When asked to 
summarize the communications the company has made concerning freedom of association, 
many workers reported that the company has announced that workers can form a union – 
but has also told them that unions are unnecessary and that workers should talk to 
management before forming one. Many workers reported that managers have told them 
that there is no need for a union because management already confers so many benefits 
upon the workforce. Some workers reported that management has told them they can form 
a union – but that if they do, and they subsequently lose their jobs, no one else will hire 
them. Other workers reported that management has characterized the formation of a union 
as an “extreme” choice that workers should not make without first going to management to 
“work things out.” Management’s statements against unionization were cited by some 
workers as one reason why they doubt the sincerity of management’s pledge to respect the 
right to organize. These workers said to interviewers that if the pledge to respect the right 
to unionize were sincere, management would not be telling workers that unions are 
unnecessary and that workers need to talk to management before forming one. 
 
Since the purpose of Russell’s communications to workers concerning freedom of 
association is ostensibly to reassure workers that the exercise of their associational rights 
will not cause management to treat them less favorably, it is singularly inappropriate for 
managers to use the opportunity of these communications to press workers not to unionize. 
Under the circumstances, it must be assumed that many workers will see an implied threat 
in such statements – and the interviews show that is indeed how many workers understood 
 5
Analysis of Employee Interviews 
Re: Russell/Fruit of the Loom  
June 19, 2009 
the communication. In some cases, as in the reference to likely blacklisting of union 
supporters, the threat conveyed was not implied, but explicit.  
 
 
IV. Summary of Responses to Standard Interview Questions 
 
All of the worker interviews commenced with a standard set of questions. The following is 
a statistical summary of workers’ responses to these questions (the percentages are out of 
the overall interview pool, across all factories). 
 
A large majority of the workers interviewed believe that the organization of a union at their 





Question: Does the worker believe an effort to 
organize a union would make it more  
likely that their factory will close? 65% 35% 
 
A large majority of the workers believe that any personal involvement on their part in 








Question: Does the worker believe management would treat 
her/him more favorably, less favorably, or the same if the 
worker told management that she/he wanted a union. 71% 12% 17% 
 
Workers were asked, in an opened-ended question, what the response of management 
would be if workers tried to organize a union at their factory. This was the initial question 
asked of all workers interviewed. The WRC classified the management responses predicted 
by workers as negative, positive, or neutral. A majority responded that there would be 
resistance from management.  
 
Negative Positive Neutral Question: What does the worker 
believe would be the response of 
management if workers tried to 
organize a union at the plant? 
70% 24% 6% 
  
Many workers cited one or another specific form of retaliatory action as the likely 
response. Among the actions workers predicted are the following: 
 
? That workers engaged in union activities would be fired 
 
? That workers engaged in union activities would be told to resign 
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? That workers engaged in union activities would be transferred out of their current 
production cells 
 
? That workers engaged in union activities would be punished in other unspecified 
ways 
 
? That management would react with hostility because unions are “prohibited” in the 
factory 
 
? That management would take various steps to ensure that a union is not created 
 
Half of the workers interviewed were aware of recent communications from factory 
management stating the company’s intent to respect the right to unionize. Of the workers 
who were aware of these communications, only one out every four believes they reflect 
management’s actual views and intentions. Nearly six out of ten of those workers believe 
the statements do not reflect management’s actual views and that management does not 
respect workers’ associational rights. This means that of all workers interviewed, barely 
one out of every eight has both heard Russell’s official pledge to respect associational 





Aware of pledge, 
but does not 
believe it is 
sincere 
Aware of 
pledge, but does 






Is the worker aware of 
management’s pledge to 
respect associational rights, 
and, if so, does the worker 
believe it is sincere? 
 
 50% 29% 7% 13% 
 
In analyzing the data presented here, it is important to note that these interviews were not 
an opinion poll. The purpose of the interviews was to determine whether Russell’s 
Honduran employees can exercise their associational rights free from fear of retaliation. If 
a substantial number of workers at a factory believes the exercise of these rights would 
draw a retaliatory response from management, this constitutes a serious labor rights 
problem, even if a majority of workers do not express such a fear.  
 
The results of these interviews are therefore particularly disturbing. Not only did a 
substantial number of the workers interviewed say they believe management would 
retaliate if workers sought to organize a union; in fact, as outlined above, most of the 
workers interviewed expressed this fear.  
 
Moreover, the EMIH interviewers believe the results, in the aggregate, likely understate 
the percentage of the interviewed workers who believe that efforts to unionize would draw 
a retaliatory response from management. EMIH reports that many workers interviewed 
responded fearfully as soon as the subject of management’s policy toward unions was 
raised. The interviewers sought to reassure workers that management was in no way 
involved with the interview process, that the interviewers had no connection to Russell, 
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and that responses would be kept in strict confidence. Despite these efforts, it is EMIH’s 
opinion that some workers interviewed were afraid to contradict what they know to be the 
official position of the company – that Russell respects worker rights – and therefore did 
not provide candid responses. Since this effect cannot be assumed, EMIH and the WRC 
have made no attempt to correct for it, but the concern should be noted. Nonetheless, even 
with the dampening effect of this potential bias, the results show widespread fear of 
retaliation among Russell’s Honduran workforce. 
 
 
V. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Interviews conducted by the WRC and EMIH with 104 workers from four different Russell 
factories indicate that many of Russell’s Honduran employees believe that they cannot 
exercise their associational rights without facing retaliation from management. The 
interviews indicate that workers fear both personal and collective forms of reprisal. Under 
such conditions, workers cannot meaningfully exercise their right to organize and bargain 
collectively.  
 
The interviews show that Russell’s Jerzees de Honduras corrective action plan has failed to 
protect the associational rights of workers at Russell’s remaining Honduran factories and 
instead has allowed a climate of fear to persist at these facilities. Indeed, the centerpiece of 
Russell’s plan – the reissuance to workers of the same pledge to respect associational 
rights that the company issued after violations were exposed in 2007 – appears to have 
been combined in many instances with the circulation of anti-union statements to these 
same workers. Unsurprisingly, almost none of the workers interviewed believe that the 
company’s pledge to respect their rights is sincere. 
 
A far more robust program of remediation is required to lift the climate of fear at Russell’s 
Honduran factories and ensure that all workers at these factories have the freedom to 
exercise their associational rights, as enumerated in Honduran law and university codes of 
conduct. The WRC’s detailed remedial recommendations, issued in a recent memorandum 






Analysis of Employee Interviews 
Re: Russell/Fruit of the Loom  
June 19, 2009 
Appendix 
 
Additional Remedial Recommendations re Russell/Jerzees de Honduras Case 
 
June 1, 2009 
 
This document outlines the remedial measures necessary to address the chilling effect on 
workers’ exercise of associational rights at Russell factories throughout Honduras caused 
by the company’s actions in the Jerzees de Honduras case.  
It is important to bear in mind that this chilling effect has been exacerbated by Russell’s 
failure to take timely and meaningful action to address the violations at JDH. More than 
seven months have now passed since the closure of JDH was announced. Russell’s 
violations of the rights of the workers at JDH, and the company’s failure to correct those 
violations in a timely fashion, have sent a powerful message to Russell employees 
throughout Honduras that any effort by workers’ to exercise their associational rights is 
futile – and will only result in workers being subjected to threats, intimidation, and, 
ultimately, losing their very livelihood. This situation is particularly damaging because 
Russell is the largest private employer in Honduras and the Jerzees de Honduras case has 
been widely-covered in the Honduran media. The influence of Russell's conduct on the 
overall labor rights environment in the country is therefore quite profound. Very extensive 
and concrete measures will be required at Russell factories in Honduras in order to reverse 
this chilling effect and enable workers to freely exercise their associational rights.    
It is important to emphasize that these measures are needed in addition to the corrective 
action that is required to address the harm directly done to the JDH workers. As you know, 
the WRC has recommended that the JDH workers be reinstated, with back pay, through 
the reopening of the JDH plant. Reinstatement with back-pay is, under international labor 
standards, the minimum remedy that is appropriate when workers lose their jobs due – in 
any significant part – to a retaliatory motive of their employer. Russell’s current 
remediation plan, which does not guarantee reinstatement to a single JDH worker, much 
less the whole workforce, does not address the harm the JDH workers have suffered.  
With respect to the chilling effect at Russell’s other factories, strenuous measures are also 
needed. There are well-established procedures for remedying the chilling effect caused 
by severe violations of workers’ associational rights and these procedures should be 
followed in the present case. The measures Russell has undertaken on this question to date 
– which center almost exclusively on the re-issuance of existing company policy on 
freedom of association – fall far short of these requirements. This is particularly true 
because, since Russell first issued its freedom of association policy in 2007, the 
company has repeatedly violated it. In general, a public commitment by a company that it 
will respect workers’ rights and will cease and desist from future violations may be 
sufficient where the violations committed are not particularly serious and the employer has 
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no prior history of such conduct.  However, where violations are severe and have 
been repeated in multiple instances, far more extensive measures are required.  
The main objective of a remediation program at the affected factories must be to create an 
enabling environment in which workers can exercise freedom of association insulated 
from any coercion from any party. First, employees must be free to meet with their co-
workers and union representatives, on factory premises, on non-work time and in non-
work areas. Second, a company policy of non-interference with freedom of association 
must be implemented in concrete terms, so that employees are convinced that, this 
time, the employer actually "means it." This must include a requirement that management 
refrain from any further conduct meant to influence workers’ exercise of their associational 
rights – since it is no longer reasonable to assume that workers, who are aware of the 
rampant retaliatory measures by taken by Russell at JDH, will be able to distinguish 
between a coercive threat and a non-coercive argument against unionization. Third, given 
the specific circumstances of the Russell case, there must also be a reasonable and 
credible commitment made regarding stability of production and employment 
at plants where workers chose to exercise freedom of association – otherwise 
workers may understandably fear that exercise of their rights will lead inexorably to plant 
closure. Fourth, a special mechanism is needed to monitor and enforce management’s 
compliance with its remedial commitments and to order remedies on a real-time basis.  
Specifically, Russell should take the following specific steps at all of its wholly-owned and 
operated facilities in Honduras: 
Access for Union Representatives 
• Afford employees, on an ongoing basis, the freedom to meet with staff and 
designated employee representatives of the JDH workers' union federation, the 
Central General de Trabajadores (CGT) in non-work areas of the factory 
and on industrial zone premises, on non-work time.  
• Provide the CGT reasonable and secure access to post literature on all factory 
bulletin boards and all places where notices to employees are customarily 
posted.    
• Afford the CGT the right to make periodic presentations to all non-management 
employees, during work time, with no loss of pay for the employees. 
 
• Offer jobs to interested worker-leaders of the JDH union 
(Sitrajerzeesh), equivalent to those they held at the JDH plant, with the 
assignment of each board member to each plant to be determined by the union 
with agreement of the employee. The presence of proven worker-leaders in 
these factories is essential if workers are to be empowered to exercise 
associational rights. This measure is necessary to counteract the effect of the 
company's prior conduct on these plants' existing workforce. 
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Notice to Workers and Non-Interference in Workers’ Decisions Concerning Their 
Associational Rights 
• Require all managerial and supervisory employees to refrain from making any 
statements regarding the exercise of freedom of association apart from 
the company's official notice of its policy and discipline any employee who 
threatens or otherwise engages in discriminatory treatment towards another 
employee on the basis of their exercise of freedom of association. In the event 
that any managerial or supervisory employee does make any statement apart 
from the company's official notice of its policy, give the union a 
meaningful opportunity to respond to all employees affected.   
• Provide workers, and the university community, with reasonable commitments 
regarding the stability of production and employment levels of its existing 
Honduran facilities. Discussion will be required among the stakeholders to 
determine what commitments are necessary and appropriate. 
• Provide to workers at all factories a letter from top executives at Fruit of the 
Loom and Russell explaining that the company’s business partners require that 
it fully respect and adopt a policy of non-interference toward workers' exercise 
of associational rights, stating that it is in the corporation’s interest to 
respect these rights, stating that the company will recognize and bargain in 
good faith with any duly constituted union workers choose to form, stating the 
company’s intention to discipline – and, if necessary, dismiss – any manager, 
supervisor or employee who discriminates against other employees' exercise of, 
or otherwise violates, freedom of association rights, and enumerating the 
remedial steps to which the company has agreed. 
Compliance and Monitoring  
• Agree to a system of compliance monitoring of these remedial actions and of 
compliance with all applicable law and codes of conduct that involves the 
following elements:   
-The appointment of a freedom of association ombudsperson, acceptable to 
both Russell and the CGT, to be supervised by the WRC. This 
ombudsperson’s role will be to monitor compliance and receive and 
investigate complaints on a real-time basis (in most cases, the day 
complaints are lodged or the following day) and, where needed, to 
recommend immediate remedial action by management.   
-The ombudsperson will have regular access to all Russell production 
facilities in Honduras, including the right to enter the facilities unannounced 
and to have the same level of access to managers, company records and 
workers as would be typically granted to a labor rights auditor. The 
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ombudsperson will have the right, when he or she deems it necessary, to 
appoint a factory-level deputy and place that person in a given factory, for 
as long as needed to address acute or ongoing problems. The deputies will 
have the same powers as the ombudsperson.  
-The company will be obligated to act in good faith both to cooperate with 
the ombudsperson and any deputies and to implement remedial 
recommendations they may make. The ombudsperson will issue regular 
reports concerning Russell’s compliance with its obligations, which the 
WRC will provide to affiliate universities and will make public. The 
ombudsperson will also have the right to request emergency intervention by 
the WRC if serious problems occur and the company fails to address them. 
The ombudsperson will establish a complaint system whereby complaints 
can be lodged and will provide information, through both printed material 
and public presentations, to all workers explaining the role of the 
ombudsperson, the complaints process, and the company’s obligations. The 
cost of the salary and expenses of the ombudsperson, and any deputies he or 
she chooses to appoint, will be born by Russell.  
• Take swift and appropriate disciplinary action against any company employee 
or manager who violates the terms of this plan, including where recommended 
by the ombudsperson. 
Collective Bargaining  
• Immediately recognize any legally constituted union formed by its 
employees and commence good faith negotiations towards a collective 
bargaining agreement in a timely manner upon that union’s request.  
 
• In order to facilitate constructive industrial relations and minimize fear on the 
part of workers of retaliation against the workforce of a particular plant for the 
exercise of their associational rights, Russell must agree, if so requested by the 
CGT, to bargain a joint, multi-factory collective agreement, covering all 
factories where workers are represented by the CGT.  
Legal Compliance 
• In addition to these measures, Russell must also comply with all applicable 
Honduran law governing freedom of association.  
Plan Development and Implementation 
These recommendations outline, in broad terms, the measures needed – in combination 
with the re-employment of JDH workforce – to restore associational rights at Russell’s 
other factories in Honduras. The WRC may also make additional recommendations, as 
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needed. With respect to many elements of the program, worker representatives will have 
the fullest understanding of how to shape each remedial measure in the way that will be 
most meaningful to workers. It will therefore necessary for the CGT to be involved in the 
development of the remedial program and specific plans for implementation.  
We continue to hope that Russell will reconsider its approach to this case and recognize its 
obligation to remediate the labor rights violations at JDH and to address the impact of 
those violations at its other production facilities in Honduras.   
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